

## EXHIBIT A TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD TOP SECRET TRANSCRIPT

[SECRET]

## [1] SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS

By authority A. C. of S., G-2.

Date 20 Aug. 43 (R. S. B.)

Original summary forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 20 August 1943. Returned on 26 August with paper clips attached, pencil notes, and parts crossed out by General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

26 AUGUST 1943

## Memorandum for the Record:

The attached memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, and Tab A, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, were given to me by General Strong at approximately 2:00 P. M., 26 August 1943, with instructions to revise Tab A as directed. Tab B, the Summary of European Documents, although prepared in the same manner as Tab A, that is, containing estimates by G-2, staff studies, memoranda and other entries of evaluated intelligence was not returned to General Strong. It is to be inferred that it will be forwarded to the President as compiled and that Tab A is to contain only raw unevaluated Military Attache reports. The Chief, Far Eastern Unit, was instructed to revise Tab A as quickly as possible as directed in Col. Sexton's memorandum.

At about 2:45 P. M., 26 August 1943, General Strong directed me to include Military Observers' reports with Military Attache reports in Tab A.

R. S. BRATTON,  
Colonel, General Staff Corps,  
Chief, Intelligence Group.

## 1 Encl.

Memo for Gen. Strong from Sec., Gen. Staff, 26 Aug. 1943.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
Washington, August 26, 1943.

## Memorandum for General Strong:

The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain *only* MA reports.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

(Signed) W. T. Sexton,  
W. T. SEXTON,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Secretary, General Staff.

## [1] JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

*Explanatory Notes*

The yearly summaries which follow are based on information contained in intelligence documents consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, et cetera. The references in the left margin of the summaries are to the Far Eastern file and G-2 file of intelligence documents which accompany these summaries. For example, G-2 13 refers to the document so marked in the G-2 file; FE 1 to the first document in the Far Eastern file. Efforts have been made to show in the summaries the origin of the statements in the text but in some instances this has

not been practicable as the same information may have come from several sources. It is therefore suggested that when the source is desired, the marginal references be compared with the tables of contents of the intelligence documents. Such a procedure will furnish a ready index to the source of the text of the summaries.

The following abbreviations have sometimes been used:

Chief, FE-----	Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department General Staff.
G-2-----	The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Military Intelligence Division), War Department General Staff (unless some other G-2 is specified.)
MA-----	Military Attache or Assistant Military Attache.
MO-----	Military Observer.
ONL-----	Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
WPD-----	War Plans Division, War Department General Staff.

When use is made of such expressions as "Tokyo reported," "Manila reported," reference is made to reports from the G-2 representative stationed at such places. In Manila it would be G-2 on the staff of the Commanding General, Philippine Department; in Singapore or Bangkok, the MO; in Tokyo, Chungking, Hongkong, or Peking, the MA.

[2]

1937

- FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were building up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instruments
- FE 3 used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reservists Association, with a large well disciplined membership scattered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year expansion program providing for (a) Increase of the Air Corps and Anti-aircraft Defenses;
- FE 4 (b) Increase of the Military Force in Manchukuo; (c) Improvement of Military Training Facilities; (d) Replenishment of War Materials; (e) Organization of Industry in the Interest of National Defense.
- FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet, during the early months of the year, references were made to the so-called "Continental Policy" and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on expansion
- FE 2 came from army leaders, there was indication of concurrence by the Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private gathering said: "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. Our duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations for overseas development."
- FE 17 In early July the so-called China Incident began and what at first
- FE 19 appeared to be a local incident in North China developed into a major
- FE 23 conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese Republic. Following
- FE 25 the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the Army and the
- FE 27 movement eventually took on the proportions of a general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army by reconstituting similar
- FE 30 units disbanded in 1925.
- FE 32 The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged. Special volunteer officers, reservists of all ranks and grades, called into active service, were to serve until relieved from active service. For members of non-mobilized units at home stations, including conscript reserve privates, where the term would normally expire in 1938 the term was extended to 1939.
- FE 31 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meeting physical requirements. The Military Attache, in Tokyo, estimated Japan
- FE 37 had 950,000 troops under arms as of 25 October. The Imperial Headquarters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only
- FE 42 on two previous occasions was this headquarters established, namely, in 1894, just prior to the Sino- [3] Japanese War, and in 1904 following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.
- FE 24 Appropriations for the Army during 1937-38 totalled Yen 2,464,078,117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,700 or 45 percent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted to Yen 5,483,-

- FE 322 364,279. Defense appropriations, both Army and Navy, represented 71.95 percent of the total budget, compared with 47.24 percent during 1936-37.
- FE 21 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building program for 1937-38. The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favorably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for 500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Squadron strength increased from 53 to 59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400 with 288 trained during the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased but the number of available planes increased by only 34 to 1223 planes of all types on 1 July. Several new airplane companies were formed and
- FE 14 plans were made for increasing production facilities with the industry, generally, showing fresh growth and new life.
- FE 26 Legislation of a war-time character enacted by an extraordinary session of the Diet meeting 3 September, included the "Munitions Industry
- FE 18 Mobilization Law" and "Military Secrets Protection Law". The Cabinet
- FE 40 Planning Board was reorganized to plan for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance with the need of the national defense program.
- FE 23 An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly
- FE 27 stated by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister, that peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with but should a situation develop like that in Spain, Japan might change her policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British and American nationals. The
- FE 23 attitude toward Great Britain was decidedly unfriendly, although Russia
- FE 35 was constantly referred to as the immediate and potential enemy.
- FE 33 The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5 October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat "Panay" brought
- FE 43 an official expression of regret with offer of restitution. The public and the press expressed hope that the United States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.
- FE 39 The seriousness of the Far Eastern situation was summarized in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Assistant Chief of [4] Staff, G-2, War Department, dated 4 November. The memorandum reads in part as follows:
- "There is a possibility, fantastic as it may seem, that Japan contemplates military action against Great Britain in the Orient at a time when she is involved in Europe, with the idea of seizing Hongkong and Singapore and ultimately acquiring the Dutch oil fields and control of trade routes to the Orient.
- It is not improbable that this country will be compelled to apply the Neutrality Act and ultimately become involved."

[5]

1938

- FE 44 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling" toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs of East Asia".
- FE 58 Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not understand Japan", or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand", and in
- FE 59 so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan" really
- FE 60 meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.
- FE 59 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure", and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United States as long as they understand each other".
- FE 60 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese nationalist group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed to the American people that the way for the United States to get "peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "... respect the position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; ... make absolutely no political activity or economic operations having political significance without the understanding of Japan; ... guide other Powers to take the same attitude".

- FE 64 The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March laid  
 FE 66a the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete wartime  
 FE 67 mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law, which  
 FE 69 was originally passed with the specific assurance that it would not  
 FE 70 be invoked for the "China Incident", virtually suspended the con-  
 FE 79 stitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance of Imperial  
 FE 88 Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and material resources  
 of the Empire exclusively for war. The Minister of War told the  
 FE 64 Japanese Army Division Commanders in April that there must be  
 a mobilization of the entire Japanese strength "because the end of  
 the China incident was remote and the changes in the international  
 situation were difficult to predict". Tokyo reported on 12 May that  
 FE 67 the Japanese War Ministry planned to issue a pamphlet which empha-  
 sized that "Japan is facing a crisis in which the fortune of the nation  
 is at stake" and that "only by strengthening this general mobilization  
 system can the ambitions of a third power be restrained". On 15  
 FE 87 November the MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the [6]  
 General Mobilization Law was gradually being put into full effect  
 through the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times  
 when propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable.
- FE 61 With the enlargement of military operations in China during 1938 the  
 mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased. On 26  
 March the MA in China reported that a total of 1,200,000 Japanese  
 FE 47 troops were under arms. Various measures to strengthen the military  
 FE 79 conscription system, to increase the efficiency of military training, and  
 FE 62 to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's colonies for military pur-  
 poses were reported during 1938. The MA in Tokyo reported on 18  
 FE 46 January that the new law to require two years of military service by all  
 conscripts in the Japanese Infantry, regardless of previous precon-  
 scription training, was necessary because of the need for "further training  
 FE 62 of soldiers in the varied weapons now in use". An Imperial Ordinance,  
 effective 3 April, provided that all Japanese subjects, including Koreans,  
 Formosans, Ainu, and South Sea Islanders, above the age of 17 might  
 volunteer for the Army, subject to selection and physical examination.  
 Under this new program 400 Koreans were selected for training in  
 1938.
- FE 47 Under the leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japa-  
 FE 79 nese educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism  
 and military training.
- FE 63 In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home air  
 defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese were  
 not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese but that  
 they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from any source"  
 and were "taking advantage of the present emergency to organize and  
 FE 68 train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordination with military  
 preparations." Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airdromes  
 near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing fields  
 in Japanese villages, were reported by the MA in Tokyo on 14 May.
- FE 65 Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army during  
 FE 66 1938-39 totalled Yen 3,823,594,189 (compared with Yen 2,464,078,117 for  
 FE 24 the fiscal year 1937-38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000 represented approp-  
 riations for the "China Incident" (against supplemental appropriations  
 of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937-38). Combined Army and Navy approp-  
 riations amounted to Yen 5,546,752,189 or 73.93 per cent of the national  
 FE 322 budget, compared with 71.95 per cent for the previous fiscal year.
- FE 68 In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous  
 "spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home [7] front  
 the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in Tokyo  
 reported on 14 May that "the response of the people appears to be all  
 that could be desired \* \* \* with stoic determination the people  
 FE 76 have set to fight a serious war". Tokyo reported "as significant" that  
 General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2 July that  
 Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore had become  
 the center of the world. General Araki emphasized Japan's "mission"  
 to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident in accordance with  
 the "Imperial Principle".

FE 75 Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July the number of Army planes were estimated to be 1,455 with 305 additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first line army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during the spring of 1937 and continues at present". Japanese aircraft production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots numbered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months.

FE 68 Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the  
FE 72 Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous  
FE 73 reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially singled  
FE 74 out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways in transporting  
FE 77 material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's apparent intention  
FE 78 of occupying Hainan Island.  
FE 85  
FE 86

FE 77 The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that  
"foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek regime"  
and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic measures to  
dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek".

FE 68 While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other  
FE 72 pressure against French, English, and American interests in Japanese-  
FE 85 occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid to China, Ger-  
FE 68 many tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such acts as the  
recognition of "Manchoukuo" on 12 May, the ban on German exports  
FE 72 of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of German military  
FE 77 advisers from China in July.

FE 73 [8] Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of  
FE 78 continued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and recurrent  
FE 79 border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July  
FE 82 and August.

FE 80 During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September, the  
FE 81 MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled newspaper  
in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai indicated  
that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy even to the  
point of war.

FE 85 After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic  
sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to take  
action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12 October that  
FE 86 such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are willing to go  
to war to back them up". Japan answered this League of Nations  
action by severing all relations with that organization on 2 November,  
but the Japanese retained their Mandated Islands.

FE 87 Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating  
to the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments,  
probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was "out-  
moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference with  
Japan's aims."

FE 61 The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having over-  
FE 77 run over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the end of 1938.  
FE 86 Japan began to consolidate her military and economic gains in North  
FE 60 and Central China, and the semi-official North China Development  
FE 72 Company and the Central China Development Company emphasized  
FE 76 the expansion of communication and transportation facilities, and the  
FE 73 production of iron, steel, coal, and synthetic oil to strengthen the  
Japanese military machine.

[9] 1939

FE 92 The territorial expansion of Japan was advanced early in the year  
by the occupation of Hainan Island. On 28 February Tokyo inter-  
preted the significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-



- China and related to this aggression the strategical implications involved: "The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the French that it is universally assigned a political motive of retaliation, in spite of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it also provides a close-in base leading into China from French territory." Concurrently, the Military Attache evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to "recent manifestations of U. S. foreign policy": "These developments [i. e., United States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification of Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian states including Japan." A subsequent statement from the Military Attache in China on 7 March reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move directed toward French Indo-China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in China.
- FE 92
- FE 94
- FE 95
- FE 103
- FE 322
- FE 101
- FE 7

[10]	Items	1936	1939
	Military manpower.....	10,250,600	10,755,000
	Army, active service.....	250,000	1,500,000
	(Army Air Corps active service).....	(12,880)	(25,500)
	Army Air Corps, Reserves.....	20,599	25,100
	Navy, active service.....	100,833	108,941
	(Navy, Air Service).....	(11,993)	(19,405)
	Navy, Reserves.....	54,089	56,437
	Army airplanes.....	1,285	1,455
	Naval airplanes.....	947	1,675
	Capital ships (including building).....	9	13
	Aircraft carriers.....	6	13
	Principal combatant ships.....	200	251

- FE 101
- The following concluding paragraphs in the 1939 Combat Estimate show the efficiency of Japan's Armed Forces and the strength of her strategical position:

"The Japanese sailors are well trained. The efficiency of the personnel of the Japanese Navy is equal to that of the British or American Navies. The morale is excellent. The Japanese Navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. The Combined Fleet works on a schedule of employment that is certain, with the quality of its personnel, to produce a highly efficient organization, and the one which will operate smoothly and effectively in time of war.

"Naval aviation has developed from fair to good, and is being rapidly expanded with modern planes and equipment.

*Geographical*

"Prior to July, 1937 Japan was essentially a militarily strong island empire whose principal islands more or less paralleled the east coast of the Asiatic Mainland from Kamchatka to a point opposite Hongkong. To the eastward her mandated islands dotted the Pacific north of the Equator between the Philippines and Hawaii. On the continent of Asia lay the Japanese territory of Korea and the Japanese controlled and dominated state of Manchoukuo.

[11] "In March, 1939, after some 20 months of war with China, Japan had added to the territory under her military control over 500,000 square miles of eastern China, including the principal ports, centers of trade and industry, railways and inland waterways, and also the principal Chinese islands southward to include Hainan. Voluntary relinquishment by Japan of the dominant influence so acquired appears highly improbable. In consequence, she now has ready access to important raw materials in China; blocks all sea approaches north of Haiphong to the southeastern coast of Asia, flanks all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power.

*Conclusions*

"The Japanese Army, though the bulk of it is widely extended over eastern China at the ends of long lines of communications, is well organized, trained and equipped. It has been eminently successful during some 20 months of active offensive operations, and its morale is high. By assuming the defensive in China, Japan can concentrate and operate with an effective army of about 1,000,000 men either in the Japanese archipelago or elsewhere in eastern Asia against any new opponent.

"Japan's Navy, standing next in strength to those of Great Britain and the United States, is modern, well balanced, and ready at war strength for active operations. It is relatively strong in battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. It would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the Western Pacific Area.

"Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.

"So long as the sea routes between Japan and eastern Asia are under the control of the Japanese Navy it would be extremely difficult for any power or combination of powers to defeat the Japanese Army in Japan or in the eastern part of the Asiatic Mainland."

FE 102 On 1 April the Military Attache in Tokyo reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese Army, as established by new combat regulations of 1939 and by observation of current military operations in China. The report stated that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army and were spending large sums on aviation, motorization and mechanization, and on increasing the strength of the division artillery. They were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of organization and tactical operation. Observation of the Japanese Army indicated that it was not a spectacular force but one rugged and capable, and that, "fired with its devotion to duty and patriotism, it would prove a dangerous foe on a battlefield of its own choosing."

FE 104 [12] Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish the nation upon a more secure war-footing. Articles 2 and 6 of the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide 1) governmental limitation of dividends, and 2) governmental regulations of wages in factories employing more than 50 workers and of a maximum working day of 12 hours.

FE 105 In April, the Military Attache in Japan, reviewing the trend in military aviation toward expansion, stated that since the beginning of the war in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air

FE 106 Corps had increased 60 per cent. Production had increased 125 per

cent, and new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40 per cent.

- FE 111 Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law which extended the term of service in the Conscript Reserve from 12 years and 4 months to 17 years and 4 months and the training period of reservists to include the Second Conscript Reserve.
- FE 112 On 9 June the Military Attache in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes occurring toward the end of May and early in June between the Japanese and British over control of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai. Ill feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as acute, particularly in Tientsin.
- FE 115 On 1 July, Tokyo reported the Army Air Corps, during the preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes numbered 1961 against 1093; and pilot strength increased to 2900 from 1600.
- FE 117 The Military Attache in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti-British campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese credo is to drive out all western influence from China"; that the time for an anti-American campaign would come; and that Japanese extremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese dominance in Asia.
- FE 123 Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken aback by the announcement of the American abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation on 26 July. The press claimed that the United States Government was abandoning the isolationist tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being deterred, according to the Military Attache, from exploiting an opportunity to push the hard-pressed British because of apprehension of Russia.
- FE 123 [13] On the same date the Military Attache in Japan estimated the future course of Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it can safely be said that Japanese foreign policy will be directed toward a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and an avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a settlement of the China war shall have been realized."
- FE 129 The Military Attache in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to G-2 a memorandum containing estimates of Japanese imperialistic designs in relation to the European war: "In the realm of foreign affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating the United States and toward taking advantage of the present European embroglio to secure as many plums as possible. \* \* \* Japan is reported to be watching carefully \* \* \* the Dutch East Indies. It is rumored that Japan is waiting for the propitious moment to take advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in that direction. \* \* \* Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and Singapore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to bear and easily lop off this rich prize."
- FE 132 On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an impending Japanese-American conflict and reported: "\* \* \* [the] Japanese realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' \* \* \* Regardless of the final outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we may take against Japan."
- FE 133 Tokyo reported on 6 November, subsequent to the speech of Ambassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic pressure upon Japan would result in "a refusal to accept such pressure supinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as may be available." The imminence of Japanese re-alignment incidental to such economic pressure was thus estimated: "Should the European struggle develop into a world war through participation by the United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world war."



FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported on 20 November by the Military Attache in Japan. Included among citations of threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a successful conclusion "without over-much regard for public opinion" \* \* \* and that although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans, "this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States should be a strong one."

FE 138 [14] The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze River. With reference to this move, the Military Attache in Japan, in his report of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which "they were not likely to be evicted except by force of arms or circumstance."

1949

FE 139 [15] As the year began the serious of the Far Eastern situation was summarized on 8 January by the Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, G-2, in a confidential lecture delivered to the faculty and students of the Army War College. The concluding remarks were:

"As to ourselves and our interests in the Far East, the future is not a bright one if we cling to the ideal involved in the renouncement of war as an instrument of national policy.

"Regardless of agreements made or to be made between our State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office, the armed forces of Japan have effectively slammed shut the 'Open Door'. It is unlikely that they can be talked into reopening it.

"Our economic stake in the Orient has gone the way of the whole edifice of diplomatic pretense which, for years, has concealed reality in the Far East.

"This stake, by some standards, such as those of national integrity and prestige, is an important one. By other and possibly more practical or business-like standards it is inconsequential, and may well be written off the books.

"The decision as to whether it is worth fighting over is, of course, not one to be made by the members of our profession.

"To one whose task it has been to follow the course of events in the Orient, however, it appears that some clear thinking on the part of the American people, leading to a decision on the question is in order.

"If the decision be that the stake is not worth salvaging, then our Government should cease making futile protests and gestures—futile because they are neither addressed to the group controlling Japan's destiny nor couched in the only language this group understands—that of the sword.

"If the decision be otherwise, we must prepare at once to go the whole way in carrying armed force to Asia, in which case our most dangerous frontier today is not in Europe, as many people would have us believe.

"It lies in the Western Pacific."

FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the road toward accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard American opinion and pressure with impunity."

FE 142 [16] In commenting to the Far Eastern Section, G-2, on 18 January on the feasibility of establishing an unofficial American air corps in Free China, Major E. C. Whitehead, Air Corps, stated: "Chennault (now Major-General Chennault) has a high opinion of Japan's ability to conduct air war."

## 3210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- FE 143 Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty  
 FE 144 on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United States were in a "state of delicate balance". Tokyo reported that Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination of the Netherlands Indies.
- FE 146 The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program. The Japanese were pushing plans for setting up the Wang Ching-wei regime in Occupied China.
- FE 147 On 30 March the Chief, FE, transmitted to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, a current estimate on the economic position of Japan which emphasized that Japan's economy was geared exclusively for war. "Her peacetime industries have been severely curtailed in their operations except insofar as they contributed to the acquisition of foreign exchange. The exchange, once acquired, has been expended: . . . only [on] such materials as were inescapably required for military use. The scarcity of these strategic materials is the key to Japanese foreign policy. It directed the program of expansion by military conquest. . . ."  
 "The application of an embargo against Japan should be carefully considered, and its possible accomplishments and failures carefully weighed. Clearly, if the United States were to embargo exports to Japan, the possible loss of trade would thereafter no longer be a deterrent to Japanese aggression. Such action would tend to kill off the remaining liberal sentiment in Japan and might force her wholly into the arms of Germany and Russia. Thereafter, the full force of the jingo element in the Army, freed of restraint, would be unleashed in all its fury, regardless of possible consequences, against the Western Powers. The only remaining courses then open to the United States would be to bow before the storm and abandon its interests in the Western Pacific, or accept immediate armed conflict."
- FE 149 G-2, in forwarding the above economic survey of Japan to the WPD, stated in part: "At the moment our relations with Japan are deteriorating. The positive economic weapon is only suspended over Japan's head. It is well known that Japan is intensively developing widespread markets and sources of raw materials with the view of [17] avoiding this weapon. What appears to be passive diplomacy seems only to effect further deterioration in relations between the two countries. No discernible diplomacy is being exercised successfully to mold Japan's course to American will. Our potential naval and military power is in the background with no definable objective to attain."
- FE 150 The American non-recognition policy toward the Wang Ching-wei regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a deal with England and France whereby those nations would not oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's neutrality in the European war.
- FE 151 Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese demand for the maintenance of the *status quo* of the Netherlands Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves."
- FE 153 The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940-41 was accounted for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and improve armaments, Tokyo reported. A chart of continuing expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible, but the decrease in the "China Incident" budget showed that new large-scale campaigns were not expected in China. In 1940-41, 67.18 percent of the national budget was to be spent by the Japanese Army and Navy.
- FE 152 After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies, while  
 FE 154 G-2 informed the Chief of Staff on 20 May of the concentration of a Japanese naval force at Palau, north of the Netherlands Indies in the Caroline Islands.

FE 155 On 31 May, G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese Navy might step forward with its "Southward Advance" as a panacea for Japan's economic ills. Pointing out that the American position with respect to the Pacific area had reached a critical stage; this report stated in part: "Our relations with Japan have deteriorated to such an extent that conciliatory gestures made at this time might well be interpreted by the Japanese as a sign of weakness and fear on our part; whereas threatening acts and gestures, whether or not we are prepared to follow them through to logical conclusions; may push Japan into the camp of the totalitarian aggressors of Europe. No discernible diplomacy has been exercised successfully to mould Japan's course in accordance with our desires. The need appears urgent, therefore, for the formulation and announcement of a national decision [15] as to advantageous and realizable objectives sought by us in the Far East; to the end that the armed services may proceed intelligently to prepare plans in conformity with those objectives."

This G-2 report of 31 May to the Chief of Staff outlined the Pacific situation in part as follows:

1. The Mandated Islands of Japan form a strategic barrier across Pacific sea lanes which menaces American defense and communications lines and cuts the United States off from the rubber and tin supplies of East Asia.

2. The French position in the Far East has deteriorated to such an extent that France has little chance to counter Japanese moves.

3. Japan sees in the present situation a "golden opportunity" to move against England's possessions at Hongkong and southward.

4. Japanese pressure was being exerted on the Netherlands Indies to gain economic concessions.

5. Thailand's policy is reported to be controlled by Army and Navy officers with pro-Japanese leanings.

FE 156 Tokyo reported concentrations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan on 7 June, while a report dated 10 June stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine tools had created "quite a furore" in Japan and that agitation for "positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.

FE 157 The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian seaboard."

FE 159 On 19 June G-2 forwarded to the Chief of Staff details of a Japanese ultimatum to Great Britain which required that the Hongkong and Burma borders be closed and that British troops be withdrawn from Shanghai if a Japanese declaration of war was to be averted.

FE 160 G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff on 20 June that the Japanese attitude toward the United States was stiffening and that the fall of the Yonai Cabinet is indicated; resulting in an Army-dominated regime or even in a military oligarchy. A concentration of Japanese war vessels was directed toward French Indo-China.

FE 161 The increasingly stiff Japanese attitude toward the United States was again reported by G-2 to the Chief of Staff on 26 June; mentioning a Japanese public relations official in New York as saying: "Japan [16] will play ball with Germany to the utter disregard of where this may lead as far as America is concerned". Manila cabled on

FE 162 28 June that the main Japanese fleet was moving southward; and that landing maneuvers were being held near Palau.

FE 163 Tokyo estimated that Japan had a minimum of 4,040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1,510 additional planes contracted for and not delivered, on 1 July. The personnel of the Japanese Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service was estimated to total 4,565 officers, 1,350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men on 1 July. Army and Navy pilots numbered 5,950. Further improvement in military aviation was

FE 169 expected with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy bombardment.

FE 164 On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan "the issue is at present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East, and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on accomplishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both Hongkong and the French Indo-China border.

FE 165 G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff on 20 July that diplomatic relations "between Japan and the United States have deteriorated to such an extent that neither threats nor offers of appeasement from Washington would be effective . . . ."

"Resignation of the Yonai Cabinet under Army pressure, and organization of a totalitarian group under Prince Konoze signify a clearing of the track for closer alignment with the Axis powers against Britain . . . ."

"To sum up; it is clear that the day has passed when official statements of disapproval from Washington will deter Japan from further aggressive moves. Neither will the negative restraint implied by the American fleet at Hawaii halt ardent Japanese nationalists who wish to capitalize upon the present 'golden opportunity' to expand the Empire . . . ."

"It is improbable that Japan will take any positive action against Great Britain at Hongkong or at Singapore until she knows the outcome of the present phase of British-German hostilities. It can be predicted with reasonable certainty, however, that the foreign policy . . . will from the outset be more aggressive with respect to Thailand, Burma, French Indo-China, and the Dutch East Indies, and with respect to foreign interests and concessions in China."

FE 166 [20] Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized, effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army for national defense, training, and administration.

FE 172 In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shake-up in the Japanese foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of Indo-China."

FE 174 On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture elsewhere. If the European war seems to point to a long-drawn-out struggle, the Japanese will eventually decide to seize the desired territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression with armed force. The Japanese believed time would be on their side, however, as they felt it would be years before America's naval and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major operations in the Far East while the German menace still existed. The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the conclusion of the China War.

FE 175 G-2, Manila, reported on 1 October: "It is the opinion of this office that the Japanese are in deadly earnest in all their activities and aspirations." The United States lacked sufficient "visible evidences" of power in the Far East, and war with Japan would come unless corrective action were taken at once.

FE 177 Tokyo reported on 5 October that the Tripartite Pact was signed after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan has decided to change her traditional policy "at least quiet relations" with the United States and to pursue a course to satisfy her national "ambition." The statement of Prince Konoze, in which he flatly declared that the question of peace or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and the

- United States respect and understand the stand of each other" expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from their present ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from Japan, China and the Philippine Islands during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-American relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggression.
- FE 178  
FE 179  
Manila  
G-2
- FE 180  
FE 181  
FE 182
- On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a non-aggression [21] pact could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her southern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations.
- FE 184
- Details of a new 10-Year Plan to weld Japan, China, and "Manchukuo" into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted from Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed.
- FE 185
- G-2, Manila, reported on 20 November that Japanese troops on the islands of Hainan and Formosa were undergoing training in extensive landing operations. Stating that Japan would not attack if we were strong enough to afford reasonable chance of failure, Manila recommended that several divisions of the Philippine Army be mobilized at once and that essential war materials be shipped to the Philippines. Large-scale troop reinforcements from the United States were not believed immediately necessary.
- FE 186  
FE 187
- Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that Japan's next move would probably be into French Indo-China. The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plans with regard to the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via Lingayen Gulf".
- FE 188
- Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements" and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.
- G-2 13
- On 27 December G-2 reported to Mr. John J. McCloy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, that by 1 September, 1941 the Japanese Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service would have an estimated 290 combat squadrons, averaging about 42 planes per squadron. These Japanese air combat units would include approximately 50 squadrons of heavy bombers and 80 squadrons of medium and light bombers.

[22]

1941

## JANUARY

- FE 190
- In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity, the Tokyo MA called attention to the progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases for operations against
- FE 196
- Malaya and Singapore. G-2 interpreted the concurrent southward movement of part of the Japanese fleet to be a form of pressure on the
- FE 198
- French in the French-Thai dispute. The Chief, FE, transmitted to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch a report from the American Ambassador at Tokyo that the Japanese were rumored to be planning a mass attack on Pearl Harbor.
- FE 193
- A Manila intelligence report of 18 January to G-2 said in part:
- "Steps should now be taken by the War Department to designate the Department Commander as Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Far East, with appropriate temporary grade. Several divisions of the Philippine Army should be ordered mobilized and mustered into the Federal Service at once, so that they may become integrated in the combat team, and so that their organization, equipment, and training can become perfected prior to the need for their use. This is a front line. The covering force is too small to permit



of a long-range mobilization and training program. The Japanese now have an expeditionary force of 70,000 troops on Hainan Island—7 divisions, 2 brigades, 1 regiment Infantry, 1 regiment cavalry, 1 regiment artillery, 1 regiment A. A. artillery, and about 400 planes of various types. An analysis of the disposition of Japanese troops indicates that Japan is not now mobilized for a major war. However, she is in a position to effect a quick mobilization and descend on the Philippines under favorable conditions. Delay in our preparation might prove fatal."

FE 197 Japan was reported by Manila to be fortifying and reinforcing the Spratly Islands southwest of the Philippines. Fully-trained Japanese parachute troops arrived near the northern border of French Indo-China.

G-2 19 G-2, estimating Alaska's position for the WPD, made this observation:

G-2 19 "In the first phase of the war . . . and if unopposed, Japan can reasonably be expected to occupy the Aleutian Islands, the Alaskan peninsula and other undefended portions of Alaska with special reference to southeastern Alaska. She may be expected to do this immediately upon the outbreak of the war, with not less than a division reinforced with aviation, antiaircraft artillery, submarines and small craft . . . ."

[23] "In any case, in a war with Japan we may expect naval raids and surprise attacks against Pacific ports of the mainland as well as against Alaska."

#### February

FE 206 Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect would be closure of many sources of information. The MA, China, reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to profit as a mediator "preserving the peace" between Thailand and French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan's warnings to the United States that she would tolerate no interference in developing the East Asia economic bloc, her inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in this bloc, and the reports that many Japanese divisions were being trained on Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies.

#### March

FE 215 G-2 transmitted to WPD a Navy memorandum concerning the disposition of the Japanese fleet, commenting that the concentration near Formosa (between 60 and 70 per cent of all combatant naval vessels) could be used to cover landings in French Indo-China; might be an attempt to threaten the United States in the Philippines; or might be preparation for other future movements based on Formosa and Hainan. On 12 March G-2 forwarded copies of a study of Japanese landing operations for widest possible circulation to Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines Headquarters. Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed Japan's move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies depended upon the outcome of Germany's offensive against England. Intense military activity in the Mandated Islands was reported by Manila. A test mobilization of the Philippine Army indicated unpreparedness to meet an enemy attack in force. FE 216  
FE 220  
FE 251 Military Observer at Singapore reviewed the disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but predicted difficulties in meeting flank attacks and in signal communications. He also reported that FE 221 the Japanese were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya.

#### April

FE 224 Tokyo pointed out that although the newly concluded Japan-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries. Manila FE 227 recommended "the immediate mobilization and muster into Federal

- FE 226 Service of at least five divisions of the Philippines Army. The Advisability of immediate action cannot be overstressed." The German Ambassador at Tokyo asked that Japanese shipping lines help evacuate German nationals from the Philippine Islands. According to the Singapore MO, [24] the British estimated that the Japanese could move six divisions simultaneously against Malaya, of which two would assalt the northern border and the others would land at Kota Bharu, Kuantan and Mersing.

May

- FE 229 G-2 informed the Under Secretary of War of the phenomenal increase in Japanese purchases of oil drilling and processing equipment immediately before the Export Control Act went into effect in February. Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan and French Indo-China were greater than normal for the China Incident and "may be there in readiness for a move against Singapore or East Indies." A report from Chungking on field operations warned that the Japanese would probably attempt an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a free hand for southward expansion should the United States become involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941-42 the Tokyo MA contrasted it with the budget for the preceding year, and pointed out that the China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.
- FE 228
- FE 231 Convinced that war with Japan was inevitable, G-2 prepared and issued a *Handbook on Japanese Military Forces* (TM 30-480, 273 pp., 14 May). A warning not to underrate the fighting ability of the enemy was sounded on page 218 as follows:
- "Tactics are without meaning unless studied in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This manual has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its accouterments, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its tactics; but it is an army which excels in durability and performance. In the same way that its infantry 'straggles' 30 miles a day and arrives at its destination on time with surprisingly few casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are practicable and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from the Japanese soldier. Furthermore the Japanese Army which fought with bows and arrows in 1870 is thoroughly capable of learning from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare. While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its own choosing."
- G-2 64 [25] On 24 May G-2 prepared for WPD an estimate of the current situation which named the isolation or containing of the Philippines and an attack of Malaya, British Borneo and the Netherlands Indies as possible courses of Japanese action.
- FE 235 G-2 prepared an *Economic Estimate of Japan* (61 pp. 27 May, 1941) which in assessing Japan's economic war potential stated (pp. 59-61):
- "Japan's present policy is to extend political control over a vast region. Raw materials in this area are to be conscripted and markets opened and held by force. The wider this territory becomes the larger become the requirements for materials to extend such an economy. Germany in Europe is a current example of Japan in Asia. Japan realizes now that only by military occupation can her bloc economy succeed.
- "With each success of Germany, Japan widens her sphere and lays more grandiose schemes. Existing world economic spheres belonging

to competing powers such as the United States and England are forced to consolidate their positions. The re-division of bloc economies and their head-on collisions are the order of a new age. Within this order is a growing shift to a barter-economy and a cornering of the basic raw materials by the conquering powers.

"The countries most strategically affected in this collision are forced either to appease or fight. The clearest example today is the fact that the United States and England must continue to sell oil to Japan or run the risk of pushing Japan into an immediate attack upon the Netherlands East Indies which would raise the likelihood of war with Australia, New Zealand, and the British forces in Malaya and Singapore. This in turn would make an American-Japanese clash almost inevitable. Anglo-American activity at the present must be centered in Europe and the Near East.

"All treaties, either economic or political, today have become as oil to grease the wheels of the present emergency in the various spheres of regional hegemony. Japan makes or breaks such treaties with impunity either to extend her progress or consolidate her position. With opportunistic designs she rides before the wind and is to be stopped only by a stronger power or combination of powers. . . .

"The essential fact remains that Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing trade or a major war effort. To procure them she must have foreign exchange. If the present unfavorable trade balance is not radically adjusted it appears that complete exhaustion of all assets capable of being converted into foreign exchange to balance the debit in international payments will occur in the near future (some say by the end of 1941). This will result in the stoppage in the inflow of a considerable part of the raw materials which are vital to the organic well-being of Japan, and her ability to wage war will be seriously curtailed."

FE 238 [26] G-2 Manila was of the opinion that Japan could not strike simultaneously at Manila, North Borneo and Singapore. However, FE 236 the dangers of a defensive attitude in that region had been emphasized in a memorandum of 28 May:

"Much attention is being given to the importance of Singapore as a naval base; consequently it stands out as a center of resistance to Japanese aggression. Such an idea presumes a defensive attitude, as Singapore is too far from the main Japanese bases to offer good chances of offensive action. It was established to guard the British line of communications.

"The Philippines are in the midst of Japanese southern bases. Their proximity permits offensive action to destroy such bases. They lie across the southern sea lanes, and therefore control them.

"A defensive attitude permits the Japanese to expand their bases to the south and east, and they are so doing. Singapore is too far away for Japan to see it as a threat. An aggressive attitude would force them to look to their home bases first, and to assume a defensive attitude. This attitude idea is important. It is well to have Singapore as an interior base—the advanced base must be the Philippines. It must be armed and equipped to take offensive action. The defensive is the last resort of the weak; it invites attack, and in the end fails. Japan is not halted by Philippines defense, rather by the offensive possibilities of the U. S. Fleet. That fleet is the stabilizing influence in the Far East. If an important part of its strength is moved to the Atlantic, Japan will at once become aggressive.

"If forced to retire to the line Alaska-Hawaii the United States will have to fight a major war to regain its present position in the Far East; meanwhile China will quickly fall and there will be no advanced bases for offensive action. For all of these reasons, this office has urged that this command be placed on a par with Hawaii and Panama, that the Philippine Army be mobilized, and that sufficient arms be provided to reasonably secure the Philippines against air and ground blitzkrieg. Our antiaircraft and antitank arms are meager, and our troop strength not imposing."

FE 237 On 29 May Chungking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had 2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes.

## JUNE

- FE 253 Tokyo reported that the Japanese Government was facing great difficulty in preserving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong and direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of trade negotiations at Batavia. On 4 June Tokyo also wrote that in May certain Japanese officers attached to northern units were receiving inoculations against yellow fever.
- FE 239
- FE 242 Hongkong reported that on 14 June twenty-seven Japanese transports convoyed by twenty-one destroyers were off the China coast travelling [27] southward, and expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. Manila on 24 June stated: "The removal of the U. S. Fleet from the Pacific will unleash Japan." Manila also forwarded a British report that 25,000 Japanese troops had received parachute training in China and Japan and that 1500 of these were stationed near Canton. On 25 June Hongkong further reported that three convoys, totalling about 50 transports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA, Mexico, FE 243 forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
- FE 255 On 27 June Chungking cabled the opinion that the Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results of border incidents revealed the potential of the Russians, and that the sudden German FE 250 offensive against Russia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward the United States.

## JULY

- FE 256 On 1 July Manila relayed a British Intelligence report that partial mobilization of all forces was under way in Japan.
- FE 271 On 12 July Hongkong reported 19 Japanese transports moving southward from Formosa. On the same day Tokyo cabled: "Considerable FE 266 scale of mobilization and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond FE 265 question". Tokyo believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evident that large scale mobilization underway covered by unusual secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukou but unable determine number or whether any being sent south."
- FE 270
- FE 274 The Chief of Staff was informed by G-2 on 15 July that on 12 July FE 279 the Japanese delivered a virtual ultimatum to Vichy, with a 20 July deadline, in which they demanded the use of eight air and two naval bases in southern French Indo-China.
- FE 273 The Singapore Observer on 16 July summarized the military situation together with notes on naval and air defense potential, and concluded that "The defense of Malaya requires six brigades. . . . The question of the defense of Singapore, however, is largely controlled by circumstances in other theaters of the present war. . . ." FE 287 Singapore also estimated that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was FE 279 approaching 40,000 men and believed there would be forcible seizure of additional bases. The Chinese G-2 was reported to anticipate an early FE 272 invasion of French Indo-China, and to believe that areas newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases. Some Japanese ships calling at FE 258 [28] Manila were commandeered by the Tokyo Government and FE 262 forced to abandon schedules.
- FE 280 London reported belief that the Japanese had completed all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases. Manila reported FE 281 the "new Japanese Cabinet, in our opinion, war-minded and capable of taking action." In a strategical estimate for the Chief of Staff on G-2 94 18 July G-2 reported Japan to have 1,064,000 tons of naval shipping and 6,200,000 tons of merchant shipping, and estimated that Japan had ground strength of 62 infantry divisions, probably to be increased to 64 by 1 July 1943. A summary of aircraft production potential on the

- G-2 95 same date indicated "a maximum annual production of 3500 aircraft and 7000 engines. These totals would gradually diminish after the beginning of hostilities with a major power. However, continued adherence to the Axis might alleviate this condition." On the basis of economic intelligence, G-2 recommended to the Chief of Staff on 25 July that a complete embargo be instituted by the U. S. A.
- FE 285 On 26 July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single draft since initial mobilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all directions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing of Japanese credits as the first step toward a final break with America.
- FE 286 Additional manpower mobilization was reported. The Japanese ordered their vessels to defer entering any American Pacific port from Alaska to the Canal, any British port on the Indian Ocean from Suez to Singapore, certain ports of East Africa, or any Australian, New Zealand, Netherlands Indies, or Philippine ports.

## AUGUST

- FE 287 The occupation of southern French Indo-China was being completed.
- FE 305 Drastic shipping control measures were instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions) located overseas. Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases. Bangkok commented: "An immediate Nipponese Bangkok Mil. ob. move is anticipated due to Thai indecision."
- FE 306 Chungking forwarded British estimates that Japanese tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars, was ten regiments, each consisting of 150 tanks, with an equal number in reserve.
- FE 288 In addition the MA at Chungking forwarded the Russian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was forty-eight divisions and twenty independent brigades (approximately fifty-eight divisions), with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. Uncalled reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions could be organized from reserves already trained and sixteen from those then in training. These figures include corps, army and service troops. Artillery was believed to be available for only eighteen new divisions. [29] Technical equipment was believed to be insufficient. The total potential strength was estimated by the Russians to be seventy-six divisions.
- FE 290 Estimates were forwarded from London that more than 500,000 Japanese were mobilized during June and July, and further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, placed Japanese strength at 49 divisions, with 54 available by the end of August when mobilization would be complete.
- FE 302 The Chief of Staff was informed that G-2 believed that the Japanese Government, with the sanction of the Emperor, had determined on a course of expansion southward for reasons of economic and strategic security, and that the "co-prosperity sphere" would be established "regardless of other developments in the world situation." To implement these policies, it was believed that Japan intended great politico-military pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand and "preparation for an attack on Siberia, but to be made at her own chosen time". It was believed that Japan would resort to every means available to keep the United States out of the war, but the following warning was sounded:
- "The great danger in the situation lies in the fact, so often proved, that Japanese military and naval authorities are not under the complete control of their Government. We have seen for the past year an extraordinary example of discipline and self-control of the German military . . . We can, unfortunately, expect no such self-denial and restraint on the part of the Japanese military. We can only hope that they will at least follow for a time the policies of their Government. . .
- "The exercise of increasingly strong 'power diplomacy' by the United States is clearly indicated."
- FE-300 Chungking reported Japanese plans to take over international concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai by surprise.
- FE-291 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working



- FE-292 at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual production for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be 2,700 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939 the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half, and capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then in sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of employees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41.

September

- FE-311 Tokyo MA reported on the organization and high quality of the [30] Japanese military signal communications system, and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to our own in every respect".
- FE-316 Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters in a move to improve arrangements for the defense of Japan Proper.
- FE-317 Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobilization Law (revised), and a tense political atmosphere were reported by Tokyo to indicate that the day for a final decision on "immutable" policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for total war. Two hundred and forty Japanese planes were reported in French Indo-China. Economic, diplomatic and military pressure was being brought to bear on Thailand by the Japanese.
- FE-310 The crisis in Japan was described by G-2 on 23 September for the Chief of Staff, with the repeated recommendation that "The exercise of increasingly strong 'power diplomacy' by the United States is clearly indicated." The Singapore MO forwarded a British Far Eastern estimate that seasonal weather conditions precluded an attack on Singapore before spring. Manila wrote that Japanese morale was high, almost bordering on fanaticism, and while added emphasis was being placed on military training in schools, older students were being required to abandon some of their classes for industrial work. A
- FE-318 G-2 summary of Japan's national defense budget showed 63.14 per cent of the total National Budget was to be used for war purposes in the fiscal year 1941-42.
- FE-315 G-2 prepared for the Chief of Staff a *Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation* for 3 September-1 December 1941. Although in summary it was thought that "her most likely, but by no means certain, course is inaction", the courses of action thought to be open to Japan included an occupation of Thailand in disregard of American opinion, the seizure or isolation of Hongkong and the Philippines and an attack upon Singapore or an attack upon Burma and the Burma Road. As for the most probable action, it was believed that—
- FE-322 "Japan, beset with uncertainties, will probably 'buy' time by entering into negotiations with the United States. A cabinet upset in Japan, a not unlikely event, will change the whole picture. The present [third Konoe] cabinet, however, will initiate no additional aggression on the part of Japan until all diplomatic means of relieving pressure have been explored and exhausted. This does not preclude independent action on the part of Japan's armies in the field . . ."
- G-2 116 The following is an extract from the combat estimate of the same document:
- "Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air [31] force of 55,000 and a trained and partially trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.
- "The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto and Manchoukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China—Thailand border in the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus 15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new units included in the above estimate.
- "Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some

of these have been replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased from 8 to 19 divisions with auxiliary troops including 4 tank regiments and 4 cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese Army is well trained and an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified to perform their various duties in peace and war. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disciplined, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to modern occidental armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

"The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy air forces is 55,000 officers and men and the two services have combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons. Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Recent acquisition of German planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air proficiency.

"The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition but there is a shortage of organizational equipment such as tanks, and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern artillery.

"Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers exclusive of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. Naval [32] strength comprises over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The latter consists of the North, Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

"The Japanese naval personnel is well trained—a training equal to that of the British and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific area."

*October*

- G-2 129 On 2 October, G-2 prepared a report for the Chief of Staff covering the crisis in Tokyo, described Konoe's desire to meet the President, and advocated forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, with the application of increasing military and economic pressure.
- FE 327 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports on the Pearl River.
- FE 331 Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China, Tokyo concluded on 20 October that "If the rumored increase goes above the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt as to the intention behind it."
- FE 332 Tokyo reported that General Tojo, on becoming Premier, retained his status as an officer on the active list, an unprecedented procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because of inability to meet army criticism of its policy towards French Indo-China, the conversations in Washington, and policy vis-a-vis a weakened Russia.
- FE 329 The Chief of Staff was further advised by G-2 that "Any cabinet selected by General Tojo may be expected to have Axis leanings, but will be otherwise anti-foreign and highly nationalistic."

- FE 335 Chunking reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November. London
- FE 334 cabled "Japanese troops in Indo-China will be strengthened as follows: 36,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." A general southward movement of
- FE 336 Japanese shipping in the Western Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with intelligence that aircraft carriers and 60 flying boats, fighters and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.
- FE 328 The China MA cabled that "Increased Nazi activity in Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near future."
- FE 339 [33] By radio on 29 October Manila reported that the "C in C combined naval and air forces" had been ordered to Takao, Formosa, where it was believed an expeditionary force was being organized.
- FE 340 On 30 October Chungking radioed that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and steadily increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the ravages of war.
- FE 341

*November*

- FE 343 The G-2 *Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation* prepared for WPD on 2 November stated the probabilities of an attack on Thailand, the containing or isolation of the Philippines and Hongkong, the seizure of the Netherlands Indies, and a possible direct attack upon Singapore.
- FE 347 G-2 on 10 November, concurred in a British opinion that Japan
- FE 348 no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with the
- FE 346 United States, and Kurusu's trip was reported by G-2, Manila, to be for the purpose of determining if America's stand was a bluff. The Japanese Consul-General at Batavia recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus avoiding violence. The Singapore
- FE 345 British, however, were reported by the U. S. MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya. British opinion in Tokyo, relayed by the London
- FE 347 MA, was that Japan would find it too difficult to attack Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack the Netherlands Indies.
- G-2 147 On 15 November G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese were equipped to carry on chemical warfare, and had done so upon occasion in China and "in the opinion of G-2, they will undoubtedly use gas whenever and wherever it seems necessary or profitable for them to do so."
- FE 352 On 16 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200 planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military planes, including trainers.
- FE 354 Conclusions reached in a summary of British Intelligence as of 18 November, were that (a) failure of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese decision whether to risk probable war; (b) Japan would probably not attack Siberia at that time; (c) unless agreement was reached in Washington, the war in China would continue; (d) Japan probably did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; (e) the occupation of Thailand, best possibility for the [34] moment, would pave the way for an attack upon Malaya later, yet minimize the risk of a general war.
- FE 356a Based on all the information available, including that from the State Department and the most secret sources, and after consultation among G-2, WPD, and the Navy, a message was dispatched on 24 November from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet (Manila) and Pacific Fleet (Pearl Harbor) and the naval commandants at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Balboa with the request that senior army officers in their respective areas also be informed. This message stated, among other

things, that there "are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan" and warned of a possible "surprise aggressive movement in any direction".

- FE 357 G-2 on 25 November reported to the Chief of Staff on the increased Japanese naval air activity throughout Melanesia and southward along the China coast. G-2 expressed to the Chief of Staff the belief that the Japanese were strong enough to meet any American-British-Netherlands Indies opposition to the invasion of Thailand.
- G-2 153 G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that ONI reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward toward Formosa, and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands.

- G-2 156 On 27 November G-2 included the following intelligence of developments in the Far East in a regular report to the Chief of Staff:

"A Naval Task Force which was reported by the 14th Naval District (Hawaii) as organized and concentrated at Taiwan and Hainan appears, according to a November 27 radio from the 16th Naval District (Manila) to be a loosely organized force on its way to an unknown concentration point. According to the latter dispatch it consists of . . . [133 units including three or four battleships, three carriers, sixteen cruisers and forty-seven destroyers and four converted seaplane carriers].

"The Japanese land forces in the Mandated Islands have been gradually increased in the last 6 months from 5,000 to 15,000 men, and they now have about 100 combat planes of all types, plus the 4th Fleet, a mixed naval force of second class units . . .

"According to British reports the Japanese have made and will continue to make aerial reconnaissance over British Pacific Islands, especially the Gilbert Group, Nauru and Ocean Islands; also over the northern portion of British Malaya . . .

" . . . it appears evident that the Japanese have completed plans for further aggressive moves in southeastern Asia. These plans will probably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that [35] the Kurusu mission is a definite failure. A task force of about five divisions, supported by appropriate air and naval units has been assembled for the execution of these plans"

- FE 358a On the same date (27 November) the Chief of the War Plans Division, after consultation with G-2, directed the dispatch of a first priority message to the commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Caribbean Defense Command stating that, among other things, "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes" and that "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." G-2 in a message to the G-2's, all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, and Hawaiian Department, instructed them to "advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin stop".
- FE 358c On 28 November G-2 directed that a radio be sent first priority warning Corps Areas and Overseas Department Commanders that because of the critical situation, all precautions should be taken immediately to guard against sabotage, subversion and espionage within their commands.

#### *December*

- FE 360 The Singapore MO advised G-2 on 2 December that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activities over Malaya were reported.
- FE 356  
FE 361 On 2 December Manila cabled that six divisions (100,000 men), 350 fighter planes, 150 medium bombers, 50 medium tanks, 450 light tanks and 200 75-mm guns had been unloaded at Haiphong, French Indo-China, and that six full divisions were on Formosa.
- FE 361a On 3 December, G-2 informed Tokyo and Peiping that an early  
FE 361b rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan had been indicated and

- FE 361c instructed them to memorize a prescribed emergency key word. They were further instructed to destroy all codes and ciphers except three cipher systems which could be readily destroyed and, when it became necessary to destroy these, to rely solely upon the memorized key. A copy of the message to Peiping was sent to the American Military Observer in Hongkong for his information.
- G-2 159 A supplementary estimate by G-2 of the military situation on 5 December raised the Japanese active army force figure to 85,000. The trained and partially trained army reserves were estimated increased to 4,750,000. Personnel figures for the naval air forces were raised to 35,000 men. Figures for combined army and navy [36] plane strength were raised to 5,353 combat planes, of which the Army had 2,362 (136 squadrons) and the Navy 2,991 (159 squadrons). This estimate concluded that:
- "Japan, because of her geographic location including her bases on Formosa and Hainan, flanks all sea approaches to the southeastern coast of Asia north of Saigon; lies athwart all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. The Formosa base is the key to this position; neutralization of Formosa would imperil all her troops and installations south of Japan proper. However, Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time assume the tactical offensive. Japan's greatest weakness lies in the vital necessity of keeping open the water lines of communication to her forces in central and south China and Indo-China over routes that are vulnerable to underwater and air attack from hostile bases in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and China."
- FE 361d On 5 December G-2 instructed G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer immediately with a naval officer on duty at Pearl Harbor, who had learned from most secret sources that weather broadcasts from Tokyo would include information regarding Japan's intention to break diplomatic relations with certain designated powers including the United States.
- FE 362 On 6 December G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese had 125,000 troops and 450 planes in French Indo-China, 50,000 troops and 200 planes on Hainan and 40,000 troops and 400 planes on Formosa.
- FE 363 On the day before the attack on Pearl Harbor a Japanese convoy with naval escort appeared off Cambodia Point in the Gulf of Siam.
- FE 366 Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands Far East Command had ordered the execution of mobilization Plan A-2 upon learning of Japanese naval movements out of Palau.
- FE 366a On the morning of 7 December, G-2 learned that the Japanese Ambassador had received instructions to deliver to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock in the afternoon a statement which rejected an American proposal of 26 November and which asserted that it was impossible to reach any agreement through further negotiations. Based on this information the Chief of Staff after consultation with G-2 and WPD, wrote a first priority radiogram which was dispatched about 12:17 p. m. to the Commanding Generals of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, and Fourth Army. The message read as follows:
- [37] "Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on the alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication stop".



## 3224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(4)

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>

## CONTENTS

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume I</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 8601, 13 Jan 37.....	The Japanese Army during 1936.....	1
Tokyo M/A No. 8631, 30 Jan 37.....	Comment on Current Events, January 21-30, 1937.	2
Tokyo M/A No. 8667, 25 Feb 37.....	[Japanese] Militarized Societies—Imperial Reservists' Association.	3
Tokyo M/A No. 8670, 1 Mar 37.....	Political Issues and Problems; 70th Session of the [Japanese] Diet.	4
Tokyo M/A No. 8681, 11 Mar 37.....	Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan].	5
Tokyo M/A No. 8707, 31 Mar 37.....	Aircraft Industrial Activity.	6
Washington, FE Section, G-2, Combat Estimate, 1 Apr 36.	Air Budgets [Japan], Appropriations for Civil and Military Aviation.	7
Tokyo M/A No. 8724, 9 Apr 37.....	Estimate of Strength, Japanese Armed Forces.....	8
Tokyo M/A No. 8738, 17 Apr 37.....	General Headquarters Air Force [Japan]. Organization of GHQ Air Force.	9
China M/A No. 9540, 23 Apr 37.....	Comment on Current Event, April 1-15, 1937.....	10
	Situation Report, April 10-23, 1937.....	10
<i>(ii)</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 8744, 23 Apr 37.....	Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Proposed Air Regiments.	11
Tokyo M/A No. 8762, 5 May 37.....	Military Aviation [Japan]. 5th Air Regiment....	12
Tokyo M/A No. 8767, 8 May 37.....	Military Aviation [Japan]. Tokorozawa Army Air Technical School.	13
Tokyo M/A No. 8775, 11 May 37.....	Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan].	14
Tokyo M/A No. 8794, 25 May 37.....	Expansion of Aviation Manufacturing Industry. Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan]. Nakajima Aircraft Factory (Otamachi, Gumma Prefecture).	15
Tokyo M/A No. 8795, 26 May 37.....	Organization of the [Japanese] Cabinet Planning Board.	16
Tokyo M/A No. 8893, 22 July 37.....	[Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident.	17
Tokyo M/A No. 8930, 10 Aug 37.....	National Defense Laws [Japan]. Military Secrets Protection Law.	18
Tokyo M/A No. 8941, 18 Aug 37.....	[Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident.	19
Tokyo M/A No. 8945, 25 Aug 37.....	Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Number and Classification of Air Units.	20
<i>Volume II</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 8948, 26 Aug 37.....	Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. July 1, 1937.	21
<i>(iii)</i>		
<i>Volume III</i>		
China M/A No. 9588 1 Sept 37.....	Situation Report Aug. 21-Sept. 1, 1937. (Shanghai Area, North China, Order of Battle.)	22
Tokyo M/A No. 8960 1 Sept 37.....	Foreign Relations—North China Incident.	23
Tokyo M/A No. 8978 15 Sept 37.....	Government Budget—War Department Budget [Japan] 1937-1938.	24
Tokyo M/A No. 8973 17 Sept 37.....	General Mobilization [Japan].	25
Tokyo M/A No. 8981 17 Sept 37.....	Mobilization of Industry—Munitions Industry Mobilization Law.	26
Tokyo M/A No. 8980 18 Sept 37.....	Foreign Relations [Japan]. North China Incident.	27
Tokyo M/A No. 8989 22 Sept 37.....	Comments on Aviation Personnel [Japan].	28
Tokyo M/A No. 9004 30 Sept 37.....	Organization and Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Movement of Air Units. Expansion Program.	29
Tokyo M/A No. 9001 30 Sept 37.....	Increase in Active Army Divisions [Japan].	30
Tokyo M/A No. 9002 30 Sept 37.....	Mobilization of Personnel [Japan]. Available Man Power.	31
<i>(iv)</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 9005 30 Sept 37.....	Commissioned, Warrant and Enlisted Personnel [Japanese Army]. Terms of Service Extended.	32
Tokyo M/A No. 9035 14 Oct 37.....	Foreign Relations [Japan]. The United States....	33
China M/O (Colonel Ord) 20 Oct 37.....	Sino-Japanese Operations.....	34
Tokyo M/A No. 9059 28 Oct 37.....	Foreign Relations [Japan]. U. S. S. R.....	35
Tokyo M/A No. 9060 28 Oct 37.....	Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain.....	36
Tokyo M/A Radiogram No. 343 29 Oct 37.....	Japanese Order of Battle in North China.....	37
Tokyo M/A Radiogram No. 345 1 Nov 37.....	Estimate of Strength of Kwantung Army.....	38

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume III—Continued</i>		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo to C/S 4 Nov 37	Far Eastern Situation.....	39
Tokyo M/A No. 9071 4 Nov 37.....	Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. Organization of the New Planning Board (Kikaku-in). National Defense Policy—General [Japan]. Military Secrets Protection Law Enforcement Regulations.	40
Tokyo M/A No. 9089 16 Nov 37.....	[Japanese] Imperial Headquarters (Daihonei). Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking..	41
Tokyo M/A No. 9099 24 Nov 37.....		42
Tokyo M/A No. 9150 22 Dec 37.....		43
[e]	<i>Volume IV</i>	
Tokyo M/A No. 9172 6 Jan 38.....	Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking (Continued from Report No. 9150, December 22, 1937).	44
Tokyo M/A (via Manila) Radiogram No. 363, 14 Jan 38.....	Japanese Warehouse and Factory Stocks, War Reserves.	45
Tokyo M/A No. 9192 18 Jan 38.....	Recruitment—Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Enrollment in the Active Army.	46
Tokyo M/A No. 9193 18 Jan 38.....	Military Schools and Colleges [Japan]. Preconscriptorial Training.	47
Tokyo M/A No. 9198, 19 Jan 38.....	Comment on Current Events, January 6-19, 1938.	48
Tokyo M/A No. 9201, 19 Jan 38.....	Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain.....	49
Tokyo M/A Radiogram No. 365, 22 Jan 38.....	Reactivation of Divisions of Japanese Army.....	50
Tokyo M/A No. 9206, 26 Jan 38.....	Armament and Equipment. Organizational-Standard [Japan]. New Equipment for the Japanese Army Air Corps.	51
Tokyo M/A Radiogram No. 368, 31 Jan 38.....	Japanese Troop Concentrations in Formosa.....	52
China M/A No. 9633, 1 Feb 38.....	Comments on Current Events, January 13-February 1, 1938.	53
Tokyo M/A No. 9219, 2 Feb. 38.....	Foreign Relations [Japan]. U. S. S. R.....	54
[ef]		
Tokyo M/A No. 9232 12 Feb 38.....	Recruitment—Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Age and Physical Standards for Enrollment in the Active Army.	55
Tokyo M/A No. 9239 17 Feb 38.....	Comment on Current Events, February 3-16, 1938.	56
Tokyo M/A No. 9240 18 Feb 38.....	Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet (Continued from Report No. 9221, February 3, 1938).	57
Tokyo M/A No. 9256 2 March 38.....	Comment on Current Events, February 18-March 2, 1938.	58
Tokyo M/A No. 9286 17 March 38.....	Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet.	59
Tokyo M/A No. 9288 18 March 38.....	Comment on Current Events, March 3-17, 1938.	60
Peiping M/A Radiogram No. 893, 26 March 38.....	Strength of Japanese Troops in China.....	61
Tokyo M/A No. 9322, 5 April 38.....	Recruitment—Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Volunteer Enrollment of Japanese Subjects—Active Army.	62
Tokyo M/A No. 9326, 11 April 38.....	Air Defense System [Japan]. Strengthening of Japanese Home Air Defense.	63
Tokyo M/A No. 9332, 13 April 38.....	Comment on Current Events, April 1-13, 1938.	64
Tokyo M/A Memo to A. C. of S., G-2, 18 April 38.	Expenditures for National Defense by Japan.....	65
[efi]		
Tokyo M/A No. 9336, 19 April 38.....	War Department Budget [Japan]. 1938-1939 Army Budget.	66
Tokyo M/A No. 9339 19 April 38.....	Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. General Mobilization Law.	66a
Tokyo M/A No. 9376, 12 May 38.....	Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. The Effect of the Protracted China Operations in Japan.	67
Tokyo M/A No. 9380, 14 May 38.....	Comment on Current Events, April 27-May 13, 1938.	68
Tokyo M/A Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, 16 May 38.	Reply to Evaluation of Reports.....	69
Tokyo M/A No. 9397, 26 May 38.....	Comment on Current Events, May 14-May 26, 1938.	70
Tokyo M/A Radiogram No. 385, 26 May 38.	Cabinet Changes Relative to China Operations; Mobilization.	71

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

## 3226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume V</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 9422, 11 June 38.....	Comment on Current Events, May 27-June 9, 1938.	72
Tokyo M/A No. 9440, 22 June 38.....	Comment on Current Events, June 10-20, 1938.	73
China M/A No. 9668, 25 June 38.....	Comments on Current Events, May 22-June 25, 1938.	74
Tokyo M/A No. 9381, 1 July 38.....	Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Annual Aviation Intelligence Report as of July 1, 1938.	75
[viii]		
Tokyo M/A No. 9462, 11 July 38.....	Comment on Current Events, June 21-July 7, 1938.	76
China M/A No. 9676, 15 July 38.....	Comments on Current Events, June 26-July 15, 1938.	77
Tokyo M/A No. 9486, 22 July 38.....	Comment on Current Events, July 8-21, 1938.	78
Tokyo M/A No. 9539, 27 Aug 38.....	Comments on Current Events, August 10-27, 1938.	79
Peiping M/A Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service), 5 Sept 38.	Japanese Military Operations in China.....	80
Peiping M/A Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service), 20 Sept 38.	Japanese Operations and Troop Dispositions in China.	81
Tokyo M/A No. 9574, 21 Sept 38.....	Comments on Current Events, August 28-September 21, 1938.	82
Peiping M/A Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service), 30 Sept 38.	Japanese Policies toward Foreign Powers in China.	83
Tokyo M/A No. 9583, 4 Oct 38.....	Government Policy Pertaining to Air [Japan]. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Law.	84
[ix]		
China M/A No. 9687, 12 Oct 38.....	Comments on Current Events, September 14-October 12, 1938.	85
Tokyo M/A No. 9607, 4 Nov 38.....	Comments on Current Political Events, October 19-November 4, 1938.	86
Tokyo M/A No. 9619, 15 Nov 38.....	Comments on Current Political Events, November 5-15, 1938.	87
Tokyo M/A No. 9623, 21 Nov 38.....	Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocation of Article II of National Mobilization Bill.	88
Tokyo M/A No. 9633, 30 Nov 38.....	Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocations of Portions of Mobilization law.	89
<i>Volume VI</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 9711, 9 Feb 39.....	National and Government Income. Taxation to Meet 1939-1940 Budget.	90
Tokyo M/A No. 9722, 27 Feb 39.....	Estimate of National Wealth of Japan.....	91
Tokyo M/A No. 9726, 28 Feb 39.....	Comments on Current Events, February 28, 1939 (No. 4).	92
Tokyo M/A No. 9734, 7 Mar 39.....	Adherence of Manchoukuo and Hungary to Anti-Comintern Pact.	93
China M/A No. 9744, 7 Mar 39.....	Situation Report, February 5th-March 6th, 1939.	94
Tokyo M/A No. 9735, 8 Mar 39.....	National Defense Policy—General [Japan]. Military Resource Secrets Protection Law.	95
[x]		
China M/A No. 9745, 9 Mar 39.....	Comment on Current Events, February 9-March 9, 1939.	96
Tokyo M/A No. 9739, 14 Mar 39.....	Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1939 (No. 5).	97
Tokyo M/A No. 9744, 23 Mar 39.....	Plan for Expansion of Production [Japan].....	98
Tokyo M/A No. 9748, 25, Mar 39.....	Appropriation for 1939-1940 Budget [Japan].....	99
Tokyo M/A No. 9749, 27 Mar 39.....	Aircraft Production [Japan] Licensed Aircraft Manufacturers.	100
<i>Volume VII</i>		
Washington, Far Eastern Section, MIL, 31 Mar 39.	Combat Estimate [Japan].....	101
Tokyo M/A No. 9755, 1 Apr 39.....	Tactical Doctrine of the Japanese Army.....	102
<i>Volume VIII</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 9754, 10 Apr 39.....	Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1939-1940 [Japan].....	103
Tokyo M/A No. 9764, 12 Apr 39.....	Comments on Current Events, April 12, 1939 (No. 7).	104

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume VIII—Continued</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 9766, 13 Apr 39..... [ri]	Aviation School System—General [Japan]. Tokyo Army Air School.	105
Tokyo M/A No. 9768, 24 Apr 39.....	Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Supplementary Air Force Strength Report as of February 28, 1939.	106
Tokyo M/A No. 9772 26 Apr 39.....	Comments on Current Events, April 26, 1939 (No. 8).	107
Tokyo M/A Memo to A. C. of S., G-2 No. 9778, 4 May 39.	Expenditures for National Defense by Japan.....	108
Washington, MID Memo for Chief, Intelligence Branch (and inclosed report) 9 May 39.	Apparent Expansion of Japan's Aeronautical Industry.	109
Tokyo M/A No. 9796 24 May 39.....	Comments on Current Events, May 24, 1939 (No. 10).	110
Tokyo M/A No. 9803 7 June 39.....	Recruitment—Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Changes in Conscription Regulations.	111
Tokyo M/A No. 9807 9 June 39.....	Comments on Current Events, June 9, 1939 (No. 11).	112
Tokyo N/A No. 130 (1939) 16 June 39.....	Attempt of the <i>New York Times</i> to Obtain a Statement Regarding Japanese Ship Building Program.	113
Tokyo M/A No. 9858 1 July 39.....	Annual Aviation Intelligence Report. Annual Aviation Digest. [Japan].	114
Tokyo M/A No. 9850 1 July 39.....	Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Aviation Statistics—MID—ONI Joint Forms.	115
[rii]		
Tokyo M/A No. 9833, 4 July 39.....	Comments on Current Events, July 4, 1939 (No. 13).	116
China M/A No. 9783, 13 July 39.....	Comment on Current Events, June 15–July 13, 1939.	117
China M/A No. 9784, 14 July 39.....	Situation Report, June 12–July 11, 1939.....	118
Tokyo M/A No. 9845, 19 July 39.....	Comments on Current Events, July 19, 1939 (No. 14).	119
Tokyo M/A No. 9859, 4 Aug 39.....	Comments on Current Events, August 4, 1939 (No. 15).	120
Tokyo M/A No. 9868, 14 Aug 39.....	Minor Military Operations Outer Mongolian Border Incident.	121
Tokyo M/A No. 9877, 25 Aug 39.....	Comments on Current Events August 25, 1939 (No. 17).	122
Tokyo M/A No. 9893, 12 Sept 39.....	[Japanese] Foreign Relations.....	123
Tokyo M/A No. 9883, 12 Sept 39.....	Minor Military Operations Outer Mongolian Border Incident, August 13–September 10, 1939.	124
Tokyo M/A No. 9902, 21 Sept 39.....	Comments on Current Events, September 21, 1939 (No. 18).	125
Tokyo M/A No. 9900 21 Sept 39.....	Minor Military Operations—Mongolian-Manchoukuo Border Incident.	126
[riii]		
Tokyo M/A No. 9906 22 Sept 39.....	Foreign Relations—Press Release on American Relations.	127
Tokyo M/A No. 9907 22 Sept 39.....	Army Finance—Donations [Japan].....	128
China M/A 1 Oct 39.....	Comments from the Field No. 3.....	129
Tokyo M/A No. 9915 2 Oct 39.....	Aviation School System—General [Japan]. Air Cadet System.	130
Tokyo M/A No. 9914 5 Oct 39.....	Aviation School System [Japan]. Mito Army Flying School.	131
China M/A No. 9810 1 Nov 39.....	Comments on Current Events, October 3–November 1, 1939.	132
Tokyo M/A No. 9955 6 Nov 39.....	Comment on Current Events, November 6, 1939 (No. 20).	133
Tokyo M/A No. 9964 20 Nov 39.....	Comments on Current Events, November 20, 1939 (No. 21).	134
Tokyo M/A No. 9973 15 Dec 39.....	Recruitment—Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Military Service Law.	135
Tokyo M/A No. 9986 16 Dec 39.....	Government Budget [Japan]. Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1940–1941.	136
Tokyo M/A No. 9995 21 Dec 39.....	Major Military Operations Field Operations in China November 18–December 18, 1939.	137
Tokyo M/A No. 9996 22 Dec 39.....	Comments on Current Events, December 21, 1939 (No. 22).	138

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
[rie]	<i>Volume X</i>	
Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton, GSC, Chief, FE Section, G-2, 8 Jan 40.	Japan and her Army (Lecture Delivered at the Army War College, Washington, D. C.).	139
Tokyo M/A No. 9998, 9 Jan 40.....	Major Military Operations. Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units Overseas, January 1, 1940.	139a
China M/A No. 9844, 11 Jan 40.....	Comments on Current Events, January 11, 1940 (No. 1).	140
Washington W. S. Anderson Memo for Chief of Naval Operations, 17 Jan 40.	Memorandum Prepared by Mr. Bruce Leighton...	141
Washington, Maj. E. C. Whitehead, Memo for Far Eastern Section, G-2, 18 Jan 40.	Comments on Conversation with Captain Claire Chennault.	142
Tokyo M/A No. 10,037, 17 Feb 40.....	Comments on Current Events, February 16, 1940 (No. 24).	143
Tokyo M/A No. 10,045, 27 Feb 40.....	Comments on Current Events, February 27, 1940 (No. 25).	144
Tokyo M/A No. 10,053, 11 March 40.....	Recruitment—Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Conscript Statistics.	145
Tokyo M/A No. 10,060, 14 March 40.....	Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1940 (No. 26).	146
[rz]		
Washington, Chief, Far Eastern Section, Memo for Chief, Intelligence Branch, 30 Mar. 40.	The Far Eastern Situation Inclosure: The Economic Position of Japan.	147
	<i>Volume XI</i>	
Tokyo M/A No. 10,074 4 April 40.....	Reciprocity in Inspections of Air Activities.....	148
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for A. C. of S., WPD 6 April 40.	Study on the Economic Position of Japan.....	149
Tokyo M/A No. 10,076 10 April 40.....	Comments on Current Events, April 9, 1940 (No. 27).	150
Tokyo M/A No. 10,091 24 April 40.....	Comments on Current Events, April 23, 1940 (No. 28).	151
Tokyo M/A No. 10,112 14 May 40.....	Comments on Current Events, May 14, 1940 (No. 29).	152
Tokyo M/A No. 10,113 16 May 40.....	War Department Budget, 1940-1941 Army Budget.	153
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S 20 May 40.	Developments in the Pacific Area.....	154
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S 31 May 40.	Situation in the Pacific Area.....	155
[zri]		
Tokyo M/A, No. 10, 128, 7 June 40.....	Major Military Operations Field Operations in China, May 14-June 6, 1940.	156
Tokyo M/A No. 10,129, 10 June 40.....	Comments on Current Events, June 9, 1940 (No. 30).	157
China M/A No. 9903, 12 June 40.....	Comment on Current Events, June 12, 1940 (No. 6).	158
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S, 19 June 40.	Attitude of the Japanese Army toward Great Britain.	159
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S 20 June 40.	Developments in the Pacific Area (No. 2).....	160
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S 26 June 40.	Developments in the Pacific Area (No. 3).....	161
Manila HPD Radiogram (Grunert) (No. 2), 28 June 40.	Japanese Naval Operations.....	162
Tokyo M/A No. 10,166, 1 July 40.....	Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan], July 1, 1940 (Notes).	163
Tokyo M/A No. 10,146, 11 July 40.....	Field Operations in China, June 20-July 10, 1940..	164
	<i>Volume XII</i>	
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S, 20 July 40.	Developments in the Pacific Area (No. 4).....	165
[zrii]		
Tokyo M/A No. 10,154 24 July 40.....	Newly Created Army Districts [Japan].....	166
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S 25 July 40.	Use of U. S. Gasoline by Japan and the Axis Powers.	167
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for A. C. of S., WPD 27 July 40.	Japanese Petroleum Statistics.....	168
Tokyo M/A No. 10,167 1 Aug 40.....	Hokota Army Air School.....	169
Tokyo M/A No. 10,169 5 Aug 40.....	Comment on Current Events (No. 53).....	170

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume XII—Continued</i>		
Manila HPD Radiogram (Grunert) 8 Aug 40.	Japanese Naval Operations.....	171
Tokyo M/A No. 10,190 4 Sept 40.....	Comments on Current Events, September 4, 1940 (No. 34).	172
Tokyo N/A No. 136 (1940) 5 Sept 40.....	Anti-Foreign Tendencies—Counter-Espionage Movement [Japan].	173
Tokyo M/A No. 10,203 19 Sept 40.....	Field Operations in China, September 4-18, 1940..	174
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo to A. C. of S., G-2 War Department 1 Oct 40.	Comments on Current Events (No. 1).....	175
Tokyo ALUSNA Radiogram to OPNAV 5 Oct 40.	Probability of Japanese Participation in European War.	176
[xviii]		
Tokyo M/A No. 10,209, 5 Oct 40.....	Alignment with Rome-Berlin Axis.....	177
Tokyo M/A No. 10,215, 7 Oct 40.....	Field Operations in China, September 19-October 5, 1940.	178
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo to A. C. of S., G-2 War Department 15 Oct 40.	Comments on Current Events (No. 2).....	179
Tokyo M/A Radiogram 29 Oct 40.....	Language Officers in Japan.....	180
Tokyo M/A No. 10,225 29 Oct 40.....	Comments on Current Events (No. 37).....	181
China M/A No. 9944 31 Oct 40.....	Comments on Current Events.....	182
Tokyo ALUSNA Radiogram 12 Nov 40.	Soviet-German Mediation in China.....	183
Tokyo M/A No. 10,234 18 Nov 40.....	Ten Year Plan for Japan, China and Manchoukuo.	184
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo to A. C. of S., G-2 War Department 20 Nov 40.	Comments on Current Events (No. 4).....	185
Tokyo M/A No. 10,241 21 Nov 40.....	Field Operations in China, November 1-20, 1940..	186
China M/A No. 9956 5 Dec 40.....	Situation Report, November 1-December 4, 1940..	187
[xix]		
Tokyo M/A No. 10,257 12 Dec 40.....	Comments on Current Events (No. 39).....	188
Manila HPD Radiogram (Grunert) 28 Dec 40.	Japanese Plans for Attack on New Guinea and Netherlands Indies.	189
<i>Volume XIII</i>		
Tokyo M/A No. 10,274 11 Jan 41.....	Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity.....	190
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department 13 Jan 41.	Japanese Expeditionary Forces (British Intelligence Reports).	191
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S 14 Jan 41.	Military Intelligence Coverage by Attaches and Observers.	192
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department 18 Jan 41.	Comments on Current Events, January 8-January 18, 1941.	193
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department 22 Jan 41	Philippine-American Relations.....	194
Washington Jules James Memo for Chief of Naval Operations 23 Jan. 41	Japanese Naval Dispositions.....	195
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo to C/S 24 Jan. 41	Southward Movement of a Portion of the Japanese Fleet	196
[xx]		
Manila, A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, 24 Jan 41.	British Intelligence Reports.....	197
Washington, Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton Memo for Col. Mason 28 Jan 41.	Report of Japanese Intention to Attack Pearl Harbor (via Ambassador Grew).	198
Peiping, Assistant M/A Memo to A. C. of S., G-2, 31 Jan 41.	Comments on Current Events (No. 13).....	199
Washington, Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton Memo for Col. Finley, 3 Feb 41.	Japanese Attempts to Secure Virulent Strains of Yellow Fever Virus.	200
Washington, Lt. Col. R. C. Smith Memo for Col. Simmons, Office of the Surgeon General, 3 Feb 41.	Japanese Attempts to Secure Virulent Strains of Yellow Fever Virus.	201
China, M/A No. 9972, 4 Feb 41.....	Situation Report, December 31-February 4, 1941..	202
China, M/A No. 9973, 5 Feb 41.....	Comments on Current Events, No. 13.....	203
Manila, HPD (Grunert) Radiogram (Paraphrase) (No. 41), 5 Feb 41.	Report of Japanese Plans for Attack on Philippines.	204

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume XIII—Continued</i>		
Washington, Jules James Memo for the Chief of Naval Operations, 6 Feb 41.	Japanese Naval Dispositions.....	205
[zzil		
Tokyo M/A No. 10,317 8 Feb 41.....	[Japanes] National Defense Security Act.....	206
Washington Col. Mason Memo for the Chief, Counter Intelligence Service in the U. S. 12 Feb 41.	Reorganization of Japanese Intelligence Service in the U. S.	207
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department 21 Feb 41.	Comments on Current Events, January 19-February 20, 1941 No. 5.	208
Washington A. C. of S., G-2; Memo for A. C. of S., WPD 25 Feb 41.	Japanese Bacteriological and Parachute Troops. . .	209
Washington, Jules James Memo for Chief of Naval Operations 25 Feb 41.	Japanese Naval Dispositions.....	210
Manila HPD No. 21 27 Feb 41.....	Indies Theatre.....	211
China M/A Dispatch to A. C. of S., G-2 1 March 41.	Comments on Current Events No. 14.....	212
Washington C/S G-2 Memo for Lt. Col. Pettigrew 4 March 41.	Letter of Instructions [for Intelligence Missions]. . .	213
Washington Col. R. C. Candee Memo for A. C. of S., G-2 4 March 41.	Far East Information [desired].....	214
[zzii]		
Washington, A. C. of S., G 2 Memo for A. C. of S., WPD 7 March 41.	Japanese Naval Dispositions (with enclosure: Memo for the Chief of Naval Operations from ONI, March 5, 1941).	215
Manila HPD, G-2 No. 23, 6 March 41....	Defenses of Pelew (Palau).....	216
Washington, Lt. Col. R. C. Smith, Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, HQ Alaska Defense Force, HQ Hawaiian Dept., HQ Philippine Dept., 12 March 41.	Japanese Landing Operations.....	217
Tokyo, M/A Radiogram No. 459, 13 March 41.	Paratroops Training in Japan.....	218
Manila, A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, 13 March 41.	Comments on Current Events, February 21-March 12, 1941 No. 9.	219
Manila, A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, 26 March 41.	Comments on Current Events, March 13-March 26, 1941, No. 10.	220
Singapore M/O. Notes from a Report of A. C. of S., G-2; HPD (March 28, 1941) 10 April 41.	Defenses of Malaya.....	221
Fort Shafter, T. H., Lt. Col. M. W. Marston Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, 3 April 41.	Japanese Landing Operations.....	222
[zziii]		
Manila, A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo to A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, 3 April 41.	Establishment of NEI Coverage.....	223
Tokyo M/A No. 10,382 18 April 14.....	Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.....	224
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, Fort Shafter, T. H. 21 April 41.	Additional Sources for Securing Information.....	225
Manila, HPD (Grunert) Radiogram (Paraphrase) (No. 881) 26 April 41.	Evacuation of German Nationals from the Philippine Islands.	226
Manila, A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, 28 April 41.	Comments on Current Events, March 27-April 28, 1941 No. 11.	227
Tokyo M/A Radiogram (Paraphrase) No. 467 2 May 41.	Japanese Preparations for Military Action Toward Singapore and East Indies.	227a
Tokyo M/A No. 10,403 5 May 41.....	Army Budget for Fiscal Year 1941-1942.....	228
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for the Under Secretary of War 7 May 41.	U. S. Exports to Japan of Oil Well Drilling Machinery and Parts and of Other Well and Refinery Machinery.	229

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume XIII—Continued</i>		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S (undated).	Need for long range, land based, heavy bombardment aviation in the Philippine Islands.	230
[zris]		
Washington, War Department, Technical Manual, 30-480, 14 May 41.	Handbook on Japanese Military Forces.....	231
<i>Volume XIV</i>		
Tokyo M/A, No. 10,414, 20 May 41.....	National Defense Budget.....	232
Tokyo M/A, No. 10,419, 21 May 41.....	Field Operations in China, May 7-21, 1941.....	233
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, 22 May 41.	Plans for Destruction of Oil Properties in Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo.	234
Washington, Far Eastern Branch, MID, Economic Estimate [Japan], 27 May 41.	Japan: Economic Estimate.....	335
Manila A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, 28 May 41.	Comments on Current Events, April 29—May 28, 1941.	236
Chungking, China M/A Radiogram (No. 83), 29 May 41.	Estimate of Japanese Air Strength.....	237
Manila HPD, G-2 Report No. 139, 29 May 41.	Hitler's Orders to Matsuoka.....	238
Tokyo M/A No. 10,434, 5 June 41.....	Yellow Fever Inoculations.....	239
[zrz]		
Singapore M/O (Col. Brink) 5 June 41...	Summary of Situation, Malaya.....	240
Washington, Col. C. H. Mason, Memo for the Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch 9 June 41.	Japanese Espionage.....	241
Hongkong M/O Cablegram No. 135 16 June 41.	Japanese Convoy Movements.....	242
Mexico City M/A No. 9899 17 June 41...	Activities of Foreigners in Country.....	243
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for the Administrator of Export Control 18 June 41.	Questionnaire of June 11, 1941 [re strength and arms of Japanese Forces in China].	244
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for the Adjutant General 19 June 41.	Assignment of Major John Weckerling.....	245
Washington, Col. C. B. Moore, Memo for M/A, Ottawa 20 June 41.	Public Utilities in Japan.....	246
Washington, Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton, Memo for A. C. of S., G-2 23 June 41.	Intelligence School Fourth Army.....	247
Manila HPD, G-2, No. 176 24 June 41...	Japan—Miscellaneous Items.....	248
[zrsi]		
Hongkong M/O, Radiogram No. 145, 25 June 41.	Japanese Convoy Movements.....	249
China M/A No. 10,001, 25 June 41.....	Comments on Current Events No. 16.....	250
Manila, A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, War Department 25 June 41.	Comments on Current Events, May 29-June 25, 1941 No. 13.	251
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for the Administrator of Export Control 26 June 41.	Expenditure of Ammunition by the Japanese Army.	252
Tokyo, M/A No. 10,447, 26 June 41.....	Comments on Current Events No. 51.....	253
Manila HPD (Grunert) Cablegram No. 1236, 26 June 41.	Japanese Troops Movement; Parachute Training.....	254
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase) 27 June 41.	Russo-Japanese Border Incidents.....	255
Manila HPD (Grunert) Radiogram No. 1274, 1 July 41.	Japanese Mobilization.....	256
Washington Col. C. H. Mason Memo for Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, 3 July 41.	Espionage Activities of Japanese Consul in Los Angeles.	257
[zrsii]		
Manila, HPD (Grunert), Radiogram No. 1301 3 July 41.	Requisition of Shipping by the Japanese Government.	258

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

## 3232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume XIV—Continued</i>		
Washington, Momo for The Record, 3 July 41.	Sabayoshi Nakayama.....	259
Washington, Col. C. H. Mason, Memo for the Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, 9 July 41.	Japanese Plan for the Use of American Negroes for Subversive and Espionage Purposes.	260
Washington, Col. R. S. Bratton, Memo for the Chief, Latin American Section 9 July 41.	Japanese Plans to Break up the "Good Neighbor" Policy.	261
Manila, HPD (Grunert), Radiogram No. 1337, 10 July 41.	Requisition of Shipping by the Japanese Government.	262
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for C/S, 11 July 41.	Inspection of Japanese Vessels.....	263
Tokyo M/A, Radiogram (Paraphrase) 12 July 41.	Japanese Mobilization.....	264
Tokyo M/A, Radiogram No. 498, 12 July 41.	Japanese Government's Plans.....	265
Tokyo M/A, Radiogram, (Paraphrase), 12 July 41.	Japanese Mobilization.....	266
<i>Volume XV</i>		
[zzziii]		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for C/S, 14 July 41.	Inspection of Japanese Vessels.....	267
Washington, Col. C. H. Mason, Letter to M/A, China, 14 July 41.	Priority on Intelligence from China.....	268
Washington, Col. C. H. Mason, Letter to M/A, Tokyo, 14 July 41.	Priority on Intelligence from Japan.....	269
Tokyo Radiogram (Creswell), No. 500, 14 July 41.	Mobilization of Japanese Army.....	270
Hongkong M/A, Radiogram No. 168, 15 July 41.	Japanese Convoy Movements.....	271
Chungking M/A, Cablegram (Paraphrase), 15 July 41.	Probability of Japanese Invasion of Indo-China.....	272
G-2 Memorandum (Lt. Odell) to Chief of Section (British Empire), 16 July 41.	Summary of Military Situation in Malay States.....	273
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S, 17 July 41.	Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.....	274
[zzziv]		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S, 17 July 41.	Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.....	275
Hawaii, G-2, Radiogram, 18 July 41.....	Japanese Mobilization.....	276
Hawaiian Army Command, Radiogram, No. 3354 22 July 41.	Japanese in Hawaii.....	277
Tokyo M/A, Radiogram (Paraphrase), 21 July 41.	Japanese Mobilization.....	278
Singapore Radiogram (Brink), No. 31, 21 July 41.	Japanese Ultimatum to French Indo-China.....	279
London M/A, Cablegram, 22 July 41.....	Japanese Designs on French Indo-China.....	280
Manila G-2, Radiogram No. 1456, 22 July 41.	Japanese Designs on French Indo-China.....	281
Tokyo M/A, No. 10,472, 23 July 41.....	Third Konoe Cabinet.....	282
Washington Director, ONI, Memo for Naval Aide to the President, 24 July 41.	Japanese Ship Movements.....	283
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2, Memo for C/S, 25 July 41.	Movement Southward of Japanese Forces.....	284
[zzzv]		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-8 memo for C/S, 25 July 41.	Sanctions Against Japan.....	285
M/A Tokyo Cable No. 605, 26 July 41.....	Japanese Troop Movements.....	285a
Tokyo M/A No. 10,476, 28 July 41.....	Comments on Current Events No. 52.....	286
Singapore Radiogram (Brink) No. 27, 29 July 41.	Japanese Aggression in French Indo-China.....	287
Bangkok M/O Cablegram, 31 July 41.....	Japanese Demands on Thailand.....	288
China M/A No. 1, 1 Aug 41.....	Comments on Current Events, Hongkong.....	289
London M/A Cablegram, 3 Aug 41.....	Japanese Mobilization.....	290
Tokyo M/A No. 10,492, 5 Aug 41.....	Annual Aviation Intelligence Report.....	291
Tokyo M/A No. 10,493, 5 Aug 41.....	Estimates of Production [Japan].....	292
China M/A No. 2, 6 Aug 41.....	Situation Report, June 16-August 6, 1941.....	293
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 8 Aug 41.	Japanese Troop Movements in Indo-China.....	294

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume XV—Continued</i>		
London M/A Cablegram, 8 Aug 41.....	Japanese Military Movements.....	295
[zzzi]		
Manila, A. C. of S., G-2; HPD Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 6, July 1-July 30, 1941, 9 Aug 41.	Individual and Special Cases; Situation Summary.	296
Delhi M/A, No. 2, 11 Aug 41	Defenses of Singapore.....	297
Washington, Col. R. S. Bratton Memo for A. C. of S., G-3, 13 Aug 41.	Antiaircraft Artillery—Japan.....	298
Hawaiian Dept., G-2, No. 2, 14 Aug 41..	General Report, Countries of the Pacific Area.....	299
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 15 Aug 41.	Probable Japanese Administration of International Settlement, Shanghai in Event of War.	300
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 19 Aug 41.	Japanese Tank Strength.....	301
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 20 Aug 41.	Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army.....	302
Washington, Lt. Col. J. G. Taylor, Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, 20 Aug 41.	Bombardment Objectives in Japan.....	303
Tokyo M/A, No. 10,506, 20 Aug 41.....	Field Operations in China—July 28-August 20, 1941.	304
Tokyo M/A, No. 10,505, 21 Aug 41.....	Comments on Current Events, August 21, 1941 (No. 53).	305
[zzzii]		
Tokyo M/A No. 10,511, 25 Aug 41.....	Distribution of Major [Japanese] Units Overseas..	306
<i>Volume XVI</i>		
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 27 Aug 41.	Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army.....	307
Chungking, China M/A Radiogram No. 31, 27 Aug 41.	Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units.....	308
Singapore GHQ, FE Dispatch, 29 Aug 41.	Lessons and Experiences of Airborne Operations Derived from the Action of the New Zealand Division in Crete.	309
Washington, Col. H. A. Kroner, Memo for A. C. of S., WPD, 29 Aug 41.	Japanese Forces in Indo-China.....	310
Tokyo M/A, No. 10,515, 1 Sept 41.....	Japanese Signal Communication.....	311
Singapore M/O, No. 48, 1 Sept 41.....	Training in Defense Against Airborne Troops.....	312
Singapore M/O, No. 52, 8 Sept 41.....	Air Defense in the Far East.....	313
Hawaiian Dept., G-2, No. 7, 10 Sept 41..	Japan and Japanese Relations.....	314
Manila, HPD, G-2, No. 277, 15 Sept 41...	Conditions in Japan.....	315
[zzziif]		
Tokyo M/A No. 10,543, 16 Sept 41.....	[Japanese] National Defense General Headquarters.	316
Tokyo M/A No. 10,544, 18 Sept 41.....	Comments on Current Events No. 54.....	317
Singapore M/A No. 60, 18 Sept 41.....	Estimates, Plans and Training—British Far East—for October, November, December and January.	318
Singapore Cablegram (Brink) No. 26, 23 Sept 41.	Japanese Troops in French Indo-China.....	319
Hawaiian Dept., G-2 No. 11, 25 Sept 41..	Japan.....	320
Singapore Cablegram (Brink) No. 30, 25 Sept 41.	Japanese Troop Movements.....	321
Washington, G-2 Study in Far Eastern Section, G-2, 29 Sept 41.	Japanese Government Budgets.....	322
Hawaiian Dept., G-2 No. 14, 29 Sept 41..	Japan.....	323
Lisbon M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 6 Oct 41.	Probability of War Between United States and Japan.	324
Tokyo M/A No. 10,567, 11 Oct 41.....	Army Arsenal and Depots [Japan].....	325
Tokyo M/A Radiogram (Paraphrase), 13 Oct 41.	Increase of Japanese Strength in Indo-China.....	326
[zzziis]		
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 14 Oct 41.	Japanese Troop Concentrations, Pearl River.....	327
Chungking M/A Cablegram (Paraphrase), 17 Oct 41.	Japanese Cabinet Crisis and Press Attacks on U. S.	328
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S, 17 Oct 41.	Japan's New Premier.....	329

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



## 3234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

## CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume XVI—Continued</i>		
Singapore M/10 No. 87, 17 Oct 41	Analysis of Japanese Aviation Production	330
Tokyo M/A No. 10,581, 20 Oct 41	Comments on Current Events, October 20, 1941 (No. 55)	331
Tokyo M/A No. 10,578, 20 Oct. 41	Resignation of Third Konoe Cabinet	332
London M/A Radiogram No. 795, 20 Oct. 41.	Estimate of Japan's Future Moves	333
London M/A Cablegram, 21 Oct 41	Japanese Military Plans	334
China M/A Radiogram No. 79, 23 Oct 41	Japanese Plans to Attack Thailand	335
Singapore M/O Radiogram No. 54, 27 Oct 41.	Japanese Aircraft Carriers in Mandated Islands	336
Hawaiian Dept., G-2 No. 21, 28 Oct 41	Japan	337
[zzzz]		
China, Col. Chennault, 2 Memoranda via Harry B. Price, Washington, 28 Oct 41.	Effective Air Operations in China	338
Manila HPD, G-2 (Evans) Radiogram (Paraphrase), 28 Oct 41.	Concentration of Japanese Forces at Takao	339
Chungking M/A Radiogram (Paraphrase) (No. C-88), 29 Oct 41.	Japanese Troop Strength in Indo-China	340
Bangkok M/A Radiogram (Paraphrase) (No. 38), 30 Oct 41.	Probable Reaction of Thailand to Japanese Attack	341
Singapore M/O Radiogram (Paraphrase) (No. 57), 31 Oct 41.	Probable Japanese Invasion of Thailand	342
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for A. C. of S., WPD, 2 Nov 41.	G-2 Estimate, Far Eastern Situation	343
Singapore Radiogram (Brink), 5 Nov 41.	Japanese Air Strength in Indo-China	344
Singapore Radiogram (Brink), 7 Nov 41.	Japanese Troop Concentrations in China and Indo-China.	345
Manila HPD, G-2 (Evans) Radiogram (Paraphrase), 8 Nov 41.	Kurusu's Mission to Washington	346
London M/A Radiogram (Paraphrase), 9 Nov 41.	Probable Japanese Attack in Netherlands East Indies.	347
[zzzz]		
Washington, G-2, Comment on Cable from London, 10 Nov 41.	Possibility of an Attack on the Netherlands East Indies.	348
Manila HPD, G-2, No. 364, 10 Nov 41	Political Situation in Japan	349
Pieping M/A Radiogram (Paraphrase) (No. 9), 11 Nov 41.	Japanese Proposals for Settlement of Far Eastern Problems via Envoy to Washington.	350
Hawaiian Army Command Radiogram No. 840, 14 Nov 41.	Purpose of Kurusu's Mission	351
Tokyo M/A No. 10,593, 16 Nov 41	Aircraft Production [Japan]	352
Wellington, New Zealand from Alusnob Radiogram, 19 Nov 41.	Japanese Movements in the Gilbert and Mandated Islands.	353
London M/A Radiogram (Paraphrase), 21 Nov 41.	Probable Japanese Offensive and Possibility of War with ABD Powers.	354
London M/A No. 45481, 21 Nov 41	Japanese Intentions	355
Singapore Radiogram (Brink), 23 Nov 41.	British Air Activity over China	356
Washington Office, Chief of Naval Operations Radiogram (copy), 24 Nov 41.	Possibility of Japanese Attack on Philippines and Guam.	356a
zzzzii]		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S, 25 Nov 41.	Far Eastern Situation	357
Bandoeng M/A No. 10, 27 Nov 41	Japanese in the N. E. I.	358
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for the Adjutant General, 27 Nov 41.	Far Eastern Situation	358a
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Radiogram (No. 473), 27 Nov 41.	Possibility of Immediate Hostilities with Japan	358b
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for the Adjutant General, 28 Nov 41.	Warning to Corps Area and Overseas Department Commanders.	358c
Chungking, M/A Secret Message No. 104, 29 Nov 41.	Probable Japanese Attack on Thailand	359
Singapore, M/O No. 133, 2 Dec 41	Alerting of Malayan Command	36
Manila, HPD, G-2 (Engelhart) Radiogram (Paraphrase), 2 Dec 41.	Japanese Troop Dispositions	361
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Radiogram (Paraphrase) to M/A Tokyo, 3 Dec 41.	Destruction of Ciphers and Codes	361a


<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>—Continued

CONTENTS—continued

Source, Date	Subject	FE Document Number
<i>Volume XVI—Continued</i>		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Cablegram (Paraphrase) to M/O Peiping 3 Dec 41.	Destruction of Ciphers and Codes.....	361b
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Cablegram (Paraphrase) to M/O Hongkong, 3 Dec 41.	Destruction of Ciphers and Codes.....	361c
Washington A. C. of S., G-2 Telegram (to A. C. of S. Hq. G-2 Hawaiian Dept.), 5 Dec 41.	Broadcasts from Tokyo referring to Weather Conditions.	361d
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for C/S, 6 Dec 41.	Estimate of Japanese Air and Ground Forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa.	362
Singapore Secret Message (Brink) No. 96, 6 Dec 41.	Japanese Naval Operations.....	363
Singapore Secret Message (Brink) No. 97, 7 Dec 41.	British Defense of Singapore.....	364
Singapore Secret Message (Brink) No. 103, 7 Dec 41.	Japanese Air Operations and Troop Movements in Malaya.	365
Melbourne, M/A Secret Message 7 Dec 41.	Execution of Plans Ordered by Netherlands Far East Command.	366
[xxxxii]		
Washington, A. C. of S., G-2 Memo for the Adjutant General, 7 Dec 41.	Far Eastern Situation.....	366a
Singapore, Secret Message (Brink) No. 105, 8 Dec 41.	Japanese Landings at Patau.....	367
Singapore, Secret Message (Brink) No. 101 8 Dec 41.	Proposed British Occupation of Kra Peninsula....	368

<sup>1</sup> Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



SECRET

(When in the State of War, Remove from the Public Domain)

From: [Redacted] (Private)  
 To: [Redacted]  
 Subject: [Redacted]  
 Date: [Redacted]

[Redacted text block containing several paragraphs of information, some of which are partially obscured by heavy black redaction marks.]